金融约束的多维度与内幕交易行为（Multidimensionality of Financial Constraints and Insider Trading Activities）

主题：金融约束的多维度与内幕交易行为（Multidimensionality of Financial Constraints and Insider Trading Activities） 主讲人：Shantanu Dutta教授 时间：2023-12-06 13:30:00 地点：延安路校区旭日楼308教室 组织单位：管理学院 报告人简介：Shantanu Dutta是渥太华大学特尔弗管理学院的金融学教授和全球金融研究员。他因其在金融领域的创新研究而获得特尔弗管理学院卓越研究奖。此前，他曾在安大略大学理工学院（UOIT）、新斯科舍省圣弗朗西斯泽维尔大学和曼谷圣母升天大学担任全职教员。在进入学术界之前，他曾在建筑材料领域全球领导者拉法基公司担任财务经理和项目总监。Shantanu Dutta 的研究重点是并购、媒体报道和财务决策、公司治理、市场效率、股息政策和技术管理。他曾在Journal of Corporate Finance、Financial Management、Journal of Banking and Finance、Review of Accounting Studies、Journal of Financial Research、Journal of Business Finance & Accounting、Journal of Multinational Financial Management、Multinational Finance Journal、Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting、Global Finance Journal、Canadian Investment Review、Corporate Governance – An International Review （CGIR）、International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance等期刊发表论文。他还在许多学术会议上参与并发表论文，他是SSHRC资助和巴克莱全球投资者加拿大研究奖（2006年）的获得者，最近，他还因在《国际管理金融杂志》上发表的文章而获得了2009年和2014年文人网络卓越奖（翡翠出版社）的“高度赞扬奖”。报告简介：This study expands upon the seminal work by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) on multidimensional financial constraints (FC) by investigating the relationship between FC and insider trading. We analyze a dataset of 51,733 insider purchasing transactions from 2,941 firms that occurred between 2003 and 2015. Unlike previous studies that rely on unidimensional financial constraint measures, we concentrate on two distinct dimensions of financial constraints, specifically the 'equity-focused' and 'debt-focused' constraints proposed by Hoberg and Maksimovic. These dimensions are associated with a firm's challenges in equity and debt issuance, respectively. Our findings reveal different patterns of insider trading between the two types of financially constrained firms. ‘Equity-focused’ constrained firms tend to have less profitable insider trades while ‘debt-focused’ constrained firms have more profitable insider trades. We also find that insiders in ‘equity-focused’ constrained firms purchase more of their own companies’ stocks despite the lower insider trading profitability. However, such purchase deals are associated with more equity financing and reduced financial constraints in the future. Conversely, insider purchase deals in ‘debt-focused’ constrained firms are not associated with future financing or reduction of future financial constraints. Our results suggest insider trading could be motivated by different types of financial constraints in a firm. 视频： 摄影： 撰写：周静 信息员：周莉莉 编辑：彭这华